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Remarks of Senator Mike Mansfield

CUR DEFENSE AND SECURITY

With the truce in Korea and the inconclusive results of the Berlin
Conference, another chapter in the book of ldstory must be considered. ( The
future of the United States of America depends on the maintenance of a sound military policy, keyed to the dangers of the atomic age and at the same time tied to
the economic and political framework of our capitalistic system.

There is no

cheap, no easy nor sure solution to the difficulties which confront us in this day
and age.

There is r.o single possible weapon which will automatically win wars or

by its very destructiveness prevent them.

The age in which we live calls for

clearer thinking, facing up to realities and sound decisions.

This period calls for

steadiness in our for e 5.gn pdicy and continuity in our military strength.
in which ,, e

liv~

pos .: _. ior

t.

s the

~ossib.i.lity

The age

that wars may be recurrent and until

a peaceful and secu.x ~ world is achieved, we must, in my opinion, always operate
on that assumption.
I

real.~. ::e

j

fu:l well

~:.at ~he

ideaHsts among us thir1k that a better way of

life can be acl:ieved for all people to the end that wa1·s will be abandoned forever.
I wish that I could hold to this ideal.

I pray that it can come true but as a matter

of practical necessity, I am afraid that long-sought-for day is beyond the period
of our immediate historical future.

In line with our responsibilities, we can no

longer afford to keep our guard-- that is, our defenses -- down.

As the leading

nation among the free countries of the world, we must assume the burden of
leadership if the peoples in the area are to retain any degree of the freedom
which they now enjoy.

We cannot afford ups and downs in either our military or

- 2 foreign policy and we sho uld re co gnize the fact the s e freedoms whi ch we enjoy
were paid fo r with o ur bloo d and o ur treasure.

We must realize further that if

we are to retain these freedoms, which t oo many o f us accept c o mpla c ently, that
we must be prepared to pay and if nee d be, to fight fo r their retention.
In the present wo rld there are two great p o wers b e hind which, to a
greater o r lesser degree, the rest of the world is aligned,
iV""

~•I

C

""'

T)lo se po wers as the
.

I

world well knows are the / United- Stat~s of America and the ~ion c £ the Soviet

Socialist R.epuhlic.

The tactical changes in Russian po licy do not mean that we

can afford to shore up our defenses, bring the boys h o me and lapse into a period
which used to be called " n o rmalcy".
The Soviet's idea to bring America to its knees is two -fold; one, to
weaken our economy to such an extent that we will have a depression at horne.
Two, to cause a split between our allies and ourselves.

Honeyed words by the

Soviets should not lull us into a sense of false security because unless these words
are transformed into deeds, and

~ntil

these deeds prove what they mean, there

can be no let-up in the deep seated friction which exists between the bee and
slave world.

Americans would be fooliah to think that tae skies abo ve and the

oceans on both sides furnish us with a really protective barrier.

We know that

we are very vulnerable and becoming more so each day as space-devouring,
ocean-spanning aircraft and missiles, submarines that can cro as the oceans submerged and atomic weapons are developed.

The fact that other frontiers are

vulnerable does not mean any less secuTity for the vulnerability of our o wn outer
life lines.

The possibility of a serio usly crippling attack against the shores o f
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the United States is something we must remember at all times and o n that basis
we must do all we can to bring about, if possible, awareness o f the danger such
an attack might inflate.
According to our best info rmed scientists, we have about a three-year
lead in the ato mic arms race in relation to the Soviet Union.

We know there have

been three atomic d e _ l = : ::J...7.~We know that the United States has
detonated at leastlt.'J)..!.weapons of all types from city-busters to atomic shells
fired by canno n.

In No vember, 1952 fo r the first time a hydro gen device blew an

hland off the map of the Pacific, created a tremendous crater in the bottom of
the o cean of sufficient capacity to comfortably accommodate 14 Pentagon buildings,
and releas e d the equivalent in power of More than five million tons of TNT as
compared to the 15, 000 - 20, 000-ton bomb of Hiroshima and the 20, 000 - ton bomb
),.J ~~ +-lt,tfi~-'+ ~ ~ ~ _.,~ ~ (XJ f'<J.-.4.+-..;-of Nagasaki. 1'1 In Wo rld War U A m erican Air Force planes all o ver the world ~

~ ~ -,:...,..:..._ c.--

dropped only two million tons of bo mbs; today 100 B-50 airpl anes wi th one

~
'-'t,c...

Nagasaki type bomb each wo uld equal that amount.

In o ther words, the hydrogen

bomb is to the atomic bomb as the atomic bom b is to TNT.

·

IJ;:::.-

We are now definitely ,..,......,.

in the hydrogen age and all the armed services of the United States are now
beginning to receive pro duction versions of guided missiles and are also continuing to develop still furth e r the t e rrible German nerve gases, developed in World ....,
War II, to even more toxic gases .

This technolo gical revolution in weapons has

decreased, no t increased, o ur security and this factor shol!ld be fully understood
by all of us.

In practically eve ry field of techno l o gical research in the weapons

of destruction, we must assume, and I think rightly s o , that the Soviet Union is
1..

k

n . lf. /c4.e.JJ --~ ) ft'l

l~'f -y. "1 0

~

~·

~

1~ r\
(l-

{'('~~~

- 4 moving along parallel paths.

The Soviet Union today has, it has been estimated,

a stockpile of between 100-175 atomic weapons.

In the opinion of certain high

rank:ng officials of the United States Air Force, she will have enough

a~omic

weapons by mid - 1954 to sustain an atomic offensive against the United States and
ou:.- allies and the planes to carry the bombs .

Our atomic

advan~age

in quantity

and quality of weapons will not be of much comfort to us if and when such a time
comes, but neither will it be too much of an advantage to an aggressor because
the aggressor knows that the retaliation ""ill be terrible and in k:.nd.
In the matter of hydrogen bombs, we might just as wel'!. face up to the

fact that the P.ussians have their scientists working on the problem and that its
development will be somewhat parallel to ours.

In addition, it is reasonable to

assume that both the Soviet Union and the free world are working on what is known

't.
as the "cobalt" bomb . ,._ This advance over the hydrogen missile could be made by
X.. f...
"seeding" atom and hydrogen bombs with cobalt." I~mLt stand the resuTiing

.ra.di&tion would ba aa .deadly tha i worud destl"6y frtcmd anQ Loe ali.J~e. 'v 7e can
see therefore that Russia in the final analyois is not getting weaker but is, in fact,
getting stronger all the time.
thei:!: st:.-ategy.

Their tactics may be changed temporarily but not

Their ultimate goal is still the same, security for the Soviet

Union ~,!1.,5!_world conquest.

These two objectives can and should be viewed as

mutually supporting and identical.
Turning to the economy of our country we can see that even he:.-e we are
entering a period of danger.

In the past few years the UnHed States has changed

from "bav.e" to a "have not" nation .

For the first time in our history, we are

-

importing more than 50o/o of our raw materials from sources outside of our own
frontiers.

This fact should be borne in mind for a better understanding of the

foreign policy of the United States and which should bring home to all of us the
continuing need which we will have on other nations as sources of supply for
these raw strategic materials.

?.

The present administration has, and I believe

rightly, abandoned the "crisis year" philos Pphy of the previous administration
and prepared, instead, not for any definite date of danger but for an indefinite
continuation of danger.
Because of the reasons enumerated, we should ::."ccognize that we face
far greater difficulties in the future than we have in the past.
today and that strength must be maintained.

We have strength

We are far better prepared at this

moment than we were prior to any of the wars in which this country has been
engaged.

Our Navy is the strongest in the world.

It is larger than all the rest

of the world's fleets put together even though 50 of its ships are to be put in
mothballs under the "new look".

We are operating a total of 25 - 30 aircraft

carriers of all types and we maintain - for the time being at least - an
a mphibious lift in commission for two divisions.
against any threat by submarine.

We arc fairly well-prepared

Of the some 400 Soviet submadnes possibly

t en are o f the modern snorkel long-range type; another 75-100 are conventional
ocean-going types; all the rest are small coastal submarines or old medium range vessels.

The United States has more long-range ocean - going submarines

than the Russians and our defenses against submarine attacks are by no means
weak.

- 6 On the question of air power, we are not weaker in number though we
may be behind temporarily in the number of modern tactical types.

The Navy

and the Marine Corps has an inventory of about 13,000 planes of all military
types (including trainers); the Air Force has about 21, 000 which, under fiscal
1955 budget plans will be increased to 22, 000 by mid-1955.

We are stronger

than the Soviet Union in long-range land-based bombers and in naval planes both
carrier-based and patrol - type.

The Soviets have g:-eater strength than we do in

land-based tactical types for support of ground armies, interception, and dayfighter missions.
The Air Force has activated more than 100 groups - - numbering from
30 to 75 planes each - - but probably no more than 85 of these groups are fully
ope:-ational at this time .

Our air power is in transition from propeller - driven.

slow - speed types to jet- powe r ed transonic and supersonic types with only onefourth of current Air Fo r ce Hying time in jets.

In the latter field the Russians

appear at the moment to be at least equal to, possibly superior to us.
The aircraft production of the two <..ountries is probably about the same
with the yearly outcome averaging between 12,000 - 14, 000 military types.
dif.Le:-ence

thou~h .

One

and it is an important one, is that we arc producing more

planes in te r ms of a i rframe weight which means more of our output rep:-esents
heavy complicated jet bombers.

Our greatest apparent disadvantage is on land .

The Marines have 3 divisions and the Army maintains 20 divisions plus 18 regi-

l2.l.a-L--~ ~ , .. t'+i~ ~ ~ . .,_

mental combat

team ~

Of the At·my divisions, six - with two being recalled

and one Mar ine division a r e in Korea; two. plus one Marine division. a r e in
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Japan; five in Europe; seven in the United States -- plus numerous regimental
comba~

teams . .md other smaller units here and .libroc.d.

Cf the seven divisions

in thz Pnited Scates, six are weak -- below strength -- and none rea.:iy for combat
except the 82d Airborne Division.
The

Russi<.:~::;

~ f;;t,./ ~ ~ ~,p.,~ ~

fl. "(

on the other hand

maintu.i;.~ ~

divisions though most of them are not at full

::.:s.cic framework of 175

stren~th.

On the basis of combat

effectiveness, which includes mobility, fixe power, etc., it is estimated that the
175 Rl'Seian divisions would
type divisio:1s.

approximat~ly

~han

equal no more

70 - 90 American-

The Soviet'c advantage of lc:.nd power is very great, particularly

since the f us.:;!c:.ns could mobi:ize from 100 - 300 additional divisions in 90 cays,
wl.e-·eas the

Unite~

States reserve strength is in no sease organized,

t:;:ain~~.

equ:.pp'!..:. .:o r combat without a long prepaJ.•atory period after wa;: starts.
mo:-e,

ai.~~1ough

at the end

o~

or

Further-

the strength of the Soviet Army is p;:actically the same as it was

World War !I-- 175 diviaions, numb:.J:-:!ng approximately 4 million

-- tile f .... ct is tl:at ai.most all the Soviet d:.visions have been thorou!;hly modernized,
mechanized and b;:ought hp to date.

Cn the basis o! what I have said, it is

appa:-ent that at t~'le momen~ the Sovbt tT::1ion has a greater advantage on land.
Th:.s, therc:or e , must be compe"lsated for by a

con~:.nuing

Amerj,can advantage

in <·he a:.r and at sea -- an advantage which we hold today and
m! ct-inion,
suf~icien~

ac~elerate

to a greater <.legree in the

ai~.

w:~ica

we

rr.•.:s~.

in

C u,.· air strength is not

to win c:.:r superio·. ity over We s~ern Europe or

Nor~heast

A sic:..

We

are fortunate t!lo ugh in havir.g some high-;.y :..ndustrialized nations among ou4•
alLes in NATO , allies actually of potentia1 strength in air power whereas in

- 8 contrast, the captive countries behind the Iron Curtain are chiefly dependent on
Soviet factories for their aircraft and equipment .

British design is abreast, or,

in some respects, ahead of the world, particularly in fighter types and in medium
or short-range jet bombers.

Though British air power is weak quantitatively

today and dependent chiefly upon U.S. F-86 jet fighters and U.S. B-29 bom')ers,
the future qualitative picture is bright.
must be added the strength of NATO.

Thus to our own strength in Europe
Despite what some people in this country

say, NATO is a great asset to the free world and the industrial Ol!.tpui: of Western
Europe, particularly, that of the Ruhr is tremendously important.

The divisions,

fleets and air forces of the thirteen countries in the NATC alliance, are not to be
taken lightly.

Exclusive of five United States divisions, the original NATO today

can put into the field 49 divisions in Western Europe plus 10 small ones in Greece;
22 large ones in Turkey and 33 in Yugoslavia.

This compares favorably with

eaotern European satellite strength of approximately 80 divisions.

Our allies

also opt:l::::-ate over 4, 000 aircraft and more than l, 000 antisubmarine and coastal
naval vessels.

In cont:-ast in the Pacific there are now 20 South Korean divisions.

There are now the beginning of six arme<.l divisions in Japan; Chiang Kai - shek has
21 d:.visions on Formosa and in Indo-China t!,e French have the equivalent to ten
divisions and in Malaya the British have 2 - 3.

There are other units all over

Asia and the Pacific but even here the back-bone of strength is America.
other hand, the Chinese Communist Army is estimated at 4 million.

Cn the

In addition

in other Asiatic countries there are fc.!"ther forces of guerrillas who are supported
and kept in the fight by supplies from Soviet Russia and Eastern Europe.

l

- 9 This, then, is where we stand today -- considerably better off, in a
military sense, than where we stood two and a half years ago, but by no means
secure.

In some ways we have gained by time; in some ways we have lost.

We

are stronger in conventional arms vis - a-vis Soviet Russia than we were, and we
have probably gained relatively in atomic weapons ,

t~ough

this relative gain

cannot continue .
Western Europe is no l onge r defenseless; the delys of a. Russian
blitzkrieg and pushover are gone .
in Europe .

Yugoslavia has th:!"own her lot in with the West

Our strength is now sufficient to force Russian re-enforcement and

thus to give us wa.rn;ag of any a t t a r
Vfe are no l onge r in the dire danger in Korea that we were in 1950; and
t~e

(

French -- faced in 1950 with the loss of the whole Red River valley in Indo-

China -- ce:!"tainly are better off today, having gained some advantages in the war
of attrition in the past two years.

In the Philippines, Malaya , and Burma, the

Communist armed struggle has definitely l ost st:i:'ength.
Cur ready military strength is considcr:!.ble, and our tremendous
military potential can be far more quickly realized than two years ago.

But to offset thes e gains is the fact that Communist China has been
strengthened, rather than

weal~encd,

by the Korean war.

This vast

As~_atic

power

seems to be more sol idly under control of its totalitaria.n leadership than it was
three yea::::-s ago , and ce r tainly it has made amazing strides in the development
of modern mili tary power -- particularly in the air (there are now 2, 500 to 3, 000
ChineJe planes , furnished by Russia) .

Thus the Chinese Red Army's weaknesses
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in air power, antiaircraft, artillc ry, communications, and mobility of supply
have been to a large extent (though not, of course, completely) r emedied, and we
may be witnessing in the Orient a historic phenomenon of tremendous importance
to our time -- the emereence of China from feudalism into a modern state.
There is another debit in the balance sheet,
by the frustration of Korea.

~aused

(but only partially)

It is a lack of drive and a declining sense of urgency

-- a sometimes apathetic morale -- and the national frictions c:.nd differences
that weaken the anti-Communist coalition.
Where , then, do we go from here -- with crisis not ended but
compounded?
/
defense

At this time a precise answer is not pes sible.
~.:'ld

out•• ana

The first Eisenl:ower

foreign aid budget was undoubtedly indicative of a trend to "stretch

.... H. o&ck", and yet to maintain a strong military posture.

But no firm

idea of where we are going -- or how fast -- was possible until: (a) the four new
membe~s

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had •• s} aken down'' in their duties and

functioned as a team; (b} a complete review of s::z-ategic plans and levels of armed
strength has been made by the new Chiefs of Staff; (c) the Eisenhower defense
budget for

~he

1955 fiscal yea"!: has been prepared; and (d) there is further develop-

ment of the meaning of recent internal events in Russia and clarificatior. of the
Comm\!Ilists ' "peace" gestures.

In this connection, the Joint Chiefs have come

up with a "new look" which no one, as yet, fully understands except that it
increases ai:· power, places major reliance

01,

the Strategic Air Command -- the

"massive retaliatory power" aspect- - and reduces the present strength of the
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps.

- 11 -

There is, however, no doubt that Congress and much of the Republican
Party are in an eco::1omy mood; that the form of economic iso lation! sm which
expresses itself in high tariff barric4's and in shar? reductions in foreign aid is
gaining strength; and that, while air powe r still ha s a great political and popular
appeal, many Congresamen believe there is
badget.

m~:c:1 wast~

Unless the world crisis sharpens, the

the fore5gn a:d

~4'ogram

services and especially

are certainly in for a perbd of ::!ollar ::-etrenchment.

The 1954 de!cnse budget,
hastily revised by

arm~d

c:.nd "fat" in the defense

Secre~r

showed the trend clearly.

prep~.ted

by the Truman

Administ~ation

but

i of Defense ~Vilson and President E~.senhowe::-,

Expenditures during the next fiscal year will not be

greatly reduced because of prior contracts and a balance on

th~

books o:

l:-~1lions

o! dollars of authol'ized funds which have nul yet been obli&ated or spent.
P.:owever, a deep cut of more than $5 billion was applied to
armed for:::es
1955 • .Such

~ppropriation

c·_;~.":s w~~l

~he

T::-um..._n

request for fiscal 1954 and the Eisenhower budget for

tcsult in an actual redncti.on of existing operating units; it

w5.11 not cut, this year, into bone or muscle or sir.ew; but it wia rnec.n a reduction
;n

d~:ive::ies

ce ·:;d:1~y

of cdrcraft and other items in future years.

irnplieq abc:.ndonm3nt of the

143-g ::o~~p

T:'e immediate results a"e that :he

proeram of the Air Force.

servi=e~:!f!J:;.-:f.:/!f;,}::;:,..·r-

boi:!- :n numbers of men in uniform ar.d in m.. mbc:os of
som-:::

O!'de:~s

Furt'Ge:w:-more, it almost

~i.vi!ian

fo:.: 11ew eq;;ipr.,ent will not be ri.aced; and

employees; that

a~so ~ha.t som~

o:-ce:&.·s will be eH:1er ca!lcelled, cut bc:.ck, or st::etcned out.

existing
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The l o n g -te r m effects arc mo r e i mpo rtant.

The cut seems to mean

that the expansion and growth of the armed forces -- though not their mode r niza tion -- is to be halted be l o w prese n t levels and under the "plateau of :.trength"
which had been the goal of the Truman

Administra ~ ion .

The Truman expansion p r ogram , hastily invoked after the Korean war,
had as its goals an Army of 2.1 active divisions (plu s 18 r egimen ta l combat teams,
etc.), a Navy of mo re than 1, 200 active ope r ating vessels and some 15, 000
modern aircraft (including Marine a irc\·a!t), a Marine Corps of 3 didsiona and
3 alr wings, and an Air Fo:rce vf 143 groups, most of thetn equipped with mo de rn
postwar aircraft

to~ ~:otal

of a bout 21, 000 planes.

The target date for these goals

was o riginally mid -1954; this wa s stretched out under President Tt uman to
1955-56 .
When President Eisenhower took offic e , the Army was shy only one of
ito 21 divioio ns, thoug!1 many of its units were incomplete; and the l'Tavy was on
the who le in good shape , though it badly ne t ded new j ets for its carriers and a
pr ogra m of shipbuilding and ship conversion.

Thus the Army and Navy had almos

reache d the levels o f their numerical expansion, though th e ir corresponding
modernization program was but half compl eted.
The Air Fo rc e, however, had r eac-hed only 110 groups on its way to the
1~ 3 - g>.·oup

goal , altho ugh S('c r etary of Defense Wil son stated in Indianapolis , on

Decembe~·

7, 1953, that h e will ask Congress in fiscal year 1955 fo r funds tv build

toward a 137 - group Air Force by mid - 1956 o r 1957.

11or eove r, o nly about 85

of these were fully ope rational, and the re was still a high percentage of
ob solescent \/orld \'lar II type aircraft.

- !3 -

In sum, the new

y....,~rarr.

sPems to mean - - 8 ur.je(;~ tv thE:> qualifying

factors previously mentioned -- tAAt the Army will stabilize at a strength of

4-~~

divisions (many under str-ength}; the Navy" wHl

b-e

.i,;

reduced somewhat in size; and

the Air Force will stabilize at something like i.37 groups.
Also, the new "plateau of strength" - - lowe!" than the old -- will
probably be reached (insofar as compl ete modernization of the servi ces is concerned} somewhat later than the previous 1955-56

d~adline.

The revised goals, plus the slowdown in the NATO prog::-am, may
ultimately result in somewhat greater combat effectiveness of the active units
even though

t~e

total strength will be less.

Cn balance, the calculated military

risk has been some'l.vhat increased, for there has been no change in our estimate
of Russian military capabilities save the obvious struggle for power now going on
in the Kremlin.

*******
***

